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ABSTRACT

This book contains two case studies--one from Zambia, one from Mozambique--of the implications for donors of pursuing sector-wide approaches (SWAps) in education. (A sector-wide approach is characterized as a sustained partnership led by national authorities involving different arms of government and, where relevant, donor agencies, with the goals of contributing to development in the context of a coherent sector through a collaborative program of work.) The purpose of the studies was to raise issues for discussion at a meeting of the International Working Group on Education (IWGE). Following a discussion of issues in the first chapter, the second chapter introduces the two case studies and puts forward some ideas about how to assess the two education SWAps. The next three chapters comprise the case studies and comparisons of the two SWAps. The next chapter focuses on donor coordination and what emerged from the cases studies and interviews with representatives of 14 different government and nongovernmental agencies from different countries. It also presents the different understandings of donor coordination and donor responsibility toward each other. The next chapter presents various views on SWAps, and the final chapter distills these views for discussion at the IWGE meeting. (WFA)

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A report from the IWGE

Sector-wide approaches in education:

issues for donor agencies arising from case studies of Zambia and Mozambique

by Abby Riddell

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Meeting of the International Working Group on Education (IWGE)
Lisbon, 19-21 November 2001

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Abby Riddell

Meeting of the
International Working Group on Education (IWGE)
Lisbon, November 2001

Paris 2002
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Executive summary

This study, which is the second report written for the International Working Group on Education (IWGE), examines the implications for donors of pursuing sector-wide approaches in education (SWAps). The purpose of the study was to raise issues for discussion at the November 2001 IWGE meeting in the hope of contributing to wider efforts at improving agency effectiveness and inter-agency collaboration in the pursuit of providing access to quality education for all.

Fourteen agencies were interviewed.[1] Six agencies that were included in the first report were followed up in this study: the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ireland Aid, the Netherlands Directorate General for International Co-operation (DGIS), the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD), the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida) and the UK Department for International Development (DfID). In addition to these, eight other agencies were included: Austrian Development Co-operation, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), DANIDA, the European Community, the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank.

Two case studies of education SWAps, the Zambian Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme (BESSIP) and the Mozambican Education

1. Those agencies included in the report are those which responded to requests to be interviewed from the list of agencies which attended the IWGE meeting in June 2000 in Florence.

Sector Strategic Plan, enabled in-country perspectives – of donor representatives and government stakeholders alike – to complement the views expressed at agency headquarters. *Table 2* summarizes the points made by individual agencies at headquarters' level in the following categories:

- policy, guidelines, organizational development;
- competences, recruitment and professional development;
- information needs and flows;
- inter-agency collaboration;
- levels of authority;
- co-ordination with multisectoral development plans.

Chapter II introduces the two case studies and puts forward some ideas about how to assess the two education SWAps. *Chapters III, IV,* and *V* comprise the case studies and the comparison of the two SWAps. *Chapter VI* focuses on donor co-ordination and specifically what emerged of relevance from the case studies and interviews at agency headquarters, presenting the different understandings of donor co-ordination and donor responsibility towards each other. *Chapter VII* presents those contrasting views of in-country personnel with the perspectives already presented of headquarters staff. The final section distils headquarter and in-country concerns around a set of issues which are put forward for further discussion by those representatives of agency headquarters attending the IWGE meeting in Lisbon in November 2001, namely:

- the appropriate roles for donor co-ordination at headquarters v. in-country level;
- whether donor agencies in SWAp environments should 'go it alone' or work towards compromises with the other agencies;
- the nature of donor responsibility towards each other;
- whether and how donor communities should be monitored for the support given to SWAps.

This study suggests that different donor agencies often face similar challenges as they try to adapt to handle better current aid modalities such as sector-wide approaches. The challenge is their own institutional development – the precise issue that is on the agenda for the ministries of education they are trying to assist. No donor agency criticized the sector-wide approach harshly in relation to helping to build sustainable capacity in partner countries' ministries of education. Yet, the commitment to SWAps by donors to ensure that they are capable of implementing such an approach covered a wide spectrum. If SWAps are intended to assist in the development of sustainable education systems, it is still too early to conclude that there are many success stories.

How well a SWAp progresses will be affected by the way in which different strands of the donor community go about their business. There has been much less monitoring of donor community activities and performance than of partner governments. Yet, for SWAps to work, the study concluded that it is necessary for the donor community to be brought into line with the visions for the sector. Information sharing is the least common denominator of a supportive donor community. Co-ordination must be built locally and supported centrally, as necessary.

In Mozambique at the time of the fieldwork, there was discussion of creating process indicators for monitoring the donor community and its co-ordination. For such measures to work, there needs to be greater clarity of and agreement on what is or is not supportive of the SWAp. Donor co-ordination, especially in relation to grappling with many of the differences in perspective that are laid out, for instance, in *Table 2*, has not really been a part of the donor communities' agendas either in Zambia or Mozambique, nor, very likely, in other countries.

The two case studies illustrate that there are still many visible rough spots concerning the achievement and reinforcement of the institutional and

behavioural changes necessary to create successfully integrated (recurrent and development) education budgets in partner countries. These rough spots cover three main areas: restructuring ministries; effecting decentralization; and the establishment of sound financial management competences. The current slow pace of SWAp implementation creates problems for all donors, both those deeply committed to SWAps and those sitting more on the fence. Firstly, the slowness limits the 'buy-in' of those looking for results on the ground. Second, the slowness disillusions those keen to spend increasing sums on education, which having been identified as a significant means of poverty alleviation, is a major tenet of most donors' development policies.

Meanwhile, few aid-dependent governments can afford to send away any of the donor community even if some of the principles of the SWAp process are compromised. Such governments are having to respond constantly to different initiatives, in spite of the SWAp environment to which multiple donors have signed up. This is the reality that needs to be addressed in bringing donor co-ordination up to a higher standard.

There seems to be consensus about the desirability of using SWAps as a means of ensuring country ownership of educational reform policies, aided by less fragmentation of ministry efforts in pursuing them. SWAps provide a means of co-ordinating the different contributions to the development of the education sector. Thus, even if there remains at present a lack of consensus over modalities of finance, all donors must ensure that they work together effectively – beyond the mere sharing of information – so that some of the current shortcomings illustrated in this study can be overcome in order to produce replicable systems of education that can deliver access to quality education for all.

Introduction

This study follows an initial report prepared for the meeting of the International Working Group on Education (IWGE) which was held in Florence, Italy in June 2000.[2] The IWGE brings together the chief education advisers of the main donors to education every 18 months. These agencies have been participating in sector-wide approaches (SWAps) to varying degrees and in different ways. There are many definitions of SWAps, as can be seen from the definitions given in *Appendix 3. Box 1* provides translations for other words commonly used by those involved in SWAp environments.

The two studies provide a background to the issues facing the agencies in pursuing such approaches. The first study presented some initial perspectives based on interviews at the headquarters of the following bilateral agencies: the UK Department for International Development (DfID), the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida), the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD), Ireland Aid, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Netherlands development co-operation programme (DGIS). This study not only extends the list of donor agencies interviewed, but also provides case studies of donor interaction in the context of two SWAps in education, the Zambian Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme (BESSIP) and the Mozambican Education Sector Strategic Plan. The purpose of this study, as with the earlier one, was to raise issues for discussion at the IWGE meeting in the hope of contributing to

2. Riddell Abby with Gustafsson Ingemar and Riitta Oksanen. 2000. "Implications for agencies of pursuing sector-wide approaches in Education", prepared as a background paper for Sida for the International Working Group on Education Meeting in Florence, Italy, 14-16 June, 2000.

wider efforts at improving agency effectiveness and inter-agency collaboration clearly in the pursuit of providing access to quality education for all.

Annual meetings on SWAps generally, and not specific to education, comprising so-called 'like-minded' agencies, have been held since 1998.[3] The IWGE meeting, however, does focus only on education and is more inclusive, covering multilateral agencies as well as bilaterals, some of whose regulations make it more difficult to enter into un-earmarked budget support.

Table 1 summarizes the positions expressed by the six agencies interviewed in the first of these IWGE reports on education SWAps. This paper spreads the net beyond these initial six agencies to Austrian Development Co-operation, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), DANIDA, the European Community, the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank.[4] Updates were also obtained from the initial agencies covered, where possible, and in addition to interviewing headquarters staff, donor representatives and Ministry of Education staff were interviewed in Zambia and Mozambique in order to gain their perspectives on efforts at donor co-ordination and collaboration through the SWAp mechanisms. *Appendices 1* and *2*, respectively, detail the interview frameworks used and lists those interviewed by agency and location. With the exception of Washington, D.C., Lusaka, Maputo and London, interviews were conducted by telephone.[5]

3. The most recent of such meetings was held in Gustavelund, Finland, 5-7 June 2001 on "Sector-wide approaches with a focus on poverty reduction".
4. Those agencies included in the report are those which responded to requests to be interviewed from the list of agencies which attended the IWGE meeting in June 2000 in Florence.
5. During the fieldwork individuals may have given their personal views in addition to those of their organizations. For a document such as this, a deliberate effort has been made not to link individuals with their organizations.

Box 1. Terms used by those involved in SWAp environments

Basket funding
The original term used for a common fund in which different donors' contributions are commingled.

Pooled funding
Another term for a common fund intended to emphazise that individual donors' funds cannot be identified – distinguishing it from a basket that can hold, for instance, several, separate components.

Sector Investment Programme (SIP)
What the World Bank calls a SWAp (See *Appendix 3,* definition 2).

Sector Programme Support (SPS)
What DANIDA and Sida call SWAps (See *Appendix 3*, definitions 3 and 7, respectively).

Table 1. Summary table of agency contributions on various issues – 2000

Agencies	Policy development Guidelines	Organization/Management
DfID	From macroeconomic to sectoral focus; linked to wide internal consultation on international development targets, targeted strategy papers and country strategy papers.	Move from geographic to strategic posts in education division; new sectoral development advisers; some country development offices in addition to regional; ongoing management review of organiztion/skills mix.

Sida	Wide internal consultation; linked to budgetary and balance-of-payments support and building on experience in education and health; guidelines being tested.	Recognizd need for support function: established focal point; internal mail network; sectoral working groups; possible special task forces; key roles for embassies.
NORAD	Ongoing review includes: from projects to programmes; country strategies; resource mobilization; geographical focus.	Task force reviewing procedures; establishment of help-desk at headquarters under consideration; closer bilateral/multilateral co-ordination recognized.
Ireland Aid	Wide internal consultation, information dissemination; DAC review of agency; production of education sector guidelines.	Small agency linkages between three sections.
Finland	Positive in principle; attention given to adequacy of accountability and financial management systems; transparent assessment criteria to be developed but no 'guidelines' as such.	Strong involvement of consultancy companies now using flexible frameworks to follow up and participate in SWAp processes; more collaboration required w/i agency and with auditors.
Netherlands	Part of overall policy change: focus on poverty reduction; reduced number of countries; sectoral approach; decentralized embassies; policy and guidelines imminent.	Task force v. line management tension led to establishment of Steering Committee; consultations required with civil society

Agencies	Competences, training and development	Workload/transaction costs
DfID	New posts: sectoral development advisers; new competences: negotiation, communication, economic and wider development annual education adviser retreats and short courses.	More manageable with new sector development advisers; ongoing work on transaction costs involved in SWAp development.
Sida	Competences: relation of education to broad objectives; negotiation; consensus-building; finance and accountability; development through seminars and participation in SWAps.	More work than traditional project preparation.
NORAD	Learn from experience; need to broaden competences: focus on systems analysis; support from Ministry of Education.	
Ireland Aid	New posts: local education advisers; informal training: annual retreats; require broader training: development, public expenditure, macroeconomics, public service reform, budgetary support – some workshops to date; change in recruitment policies.	More work at headquarters and in country; should improve with new posts.
Finland	No change in staff recruitment, though more advisers; some training sessions: introduction to SWAps and economic and financial management; participation in seminars; learning by doing; close co-operation with other agencies on training required.	Qualitative, not quantitative changes in workload: new expertise required – aid management, macroeconomics, and aid policy.
Netherlands	New series of training modules; dialogue and discussion; revised job descriptions.	

Agencies	Information	Inter-agency contacts and collaboration
DfID	Wide consultation on different strategy papers; attention may need to be paid to information flow between political and development arms.	Variation in agency roles by country; collaboration could be formalized and reinforced by international-level dialogue; EC could be given greater co-ordinating role; dialogue could be strengthened; local staff require authority.
Sida	Different information needs – strategic and policy issues and relationship of education to broader development; public information should focus on achievements within sector or system as a whole.	Individuals produce local variations of collaboration; need for harmonization of procedures – financial reporting, procurement, etc.
Ireland Aid	Development co-operation the focus, not political issues; internal e-mail has helped flow of information; demands on education adviser.	Use of each others' expertise could be more wide-ranging; collaboration on training possible.
Finland	Increased need for management, administrative and organizational information; increased volume of information especially on non-educational issues (e.g. economic and financial management).	SWAps have resulted in more frequent and closer co-operation; inadequate local staffing produces bottlenecks; joint capacity development welcome.
Netherlands	Country teams established to improve communication; web site established.	Harmonization between agencies- key.

This study, like the one before, investigates the institutional development of the donor agencies themselves, in dealing in SWAp environments. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), however, were not on the agenda at the time of the first study. Thus, the interview framework included some questioning on the extent of integration of sector-wide approaches with multisectoral development plans such as PRSPs, as well as the other categories investigated previously:

- new demands on agency competences and how they have been dealt with;
- changes in workload and consequences;
- internal development and training of staff that has taken place and identified needs for further training and adequate methods;
- internal processes to create acceptance for the SWAp methodology;
- consequences for intra-agency, as well as inter-agency, collaboration;
- development of policies and guidelines;
- changes in organization related to SWAps;
- type of contacts with other agencies and results.

The two case studies enable one to assess the achievements and challenges that lie ahead in successful donor co-ordination and collaboration in sector-wide approaches in education.

The paper is organized as follows. *Chapter I* summarises and provides a synthesis of the concerns and issues raised by headquarters personnel about the implications for donor agencies of pursuing sector-wide approaches in education. *Table 2* summarizes the points made by individual agencies at headquarters level. *Chapter II* introduces the two case studies and puts forward some ideas about how to assess the two education SWAps. *Chapters III* and *IV* comprise the case studies of the Zambian Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme and the Mozambican Education Sector Strategic Plan, respectively, and *Chapter V* compares the two SWAps.

Chapter VI focuses on donor co-ordination and specifically what emerged of relevance from the case studies and interviews at agency headquarters, presenting the different understandings of donor co-ordination and donor responsibility towards each other. *Chapter VII* presents those contrasting views of in-country personnel with the perspectives already presented of headquarters staff. The final section distils headquarter and in-country concerns around a set of issues put forward for further discussion by those representatives of agency headquarters attending the IWGE meeting in Lisbon in November 2001.

Chapter 1
Synthesis of issues raised at agency headquarters

Table 2 synthesizes many hours of interviews, conducted mainly by telephone, but in the case of the World Bank, USAID and DfID, in person. Because agency policies above the level of the education sector were included in the interview framework, those interviewed embraced, where possible, not only those handling education SWAps, but also those dealing with PRSPs, policy formulation and donor co-ordination. The interview frameworks found in *Appendix 2* were extended to other issues which the respondents felt were additionally important in explaining the implications for their agencies of pursuing education SWAps.

Table 2. Synthesis of issues raised at agency headquarters – 2001

Policy/Guidelines/Organizational development

Austria	1999 education policy guidelines issued; more concentration on basic and non-formal education, including lifelong learning; some movement from projects towards programmes; more strategic discussions and intersectoral programmes.
CIDA	CIDA is strengthening its policy direction; renewing its cadre of scientific and technical personnel; and recruiting young officers whilst updating and rebuilding its information and knowledge networks; it is trying to simplify work processes and is engaging in pilot projects on new programming approaches including SWAps; projects will remain the formal means for most of its aid-delivery but increasingly they will be integrated into larger shared strategies; procedures require more flexibility than at present; it respects SWAp principles, but it is a challenge to meet them; the

	job is to connect policy orientation on aid effectiveness to practical applications in programmes; good intra-agency communication.
DANIDA	A change in policy approach began in the mid-1990s, focusing on a maximum of 20 countries with a maximum of three-four sectors/ country; Sector Programme Support (SPS) is close to a SWAp, but in a transitory phase may appear very much like traditional projects; SPS should not simply be equated with budget support alone; senior management is for SWAps in principle, but the information requirements run counter to SWAps (political leadership wants to show what difference their money makes); they are committed to taking steps towards harmonizing their procedures; they will support national capacity building through targeted TA.
DfID	More country offices have been created, partly a reflection of the need for more policy dialogue and longer-term involvement; there is pressure within DfID to move to have impact at higher levels, viz. PRSP, macroeconomic budgetary support; geographical, institutional and strategic guidelines are currently being drawn up to better prioritize and to minimize the distortion of policies by new initiatives.
EC	New sectoral policy support guidelines have been written: budgetary support whenever favourable conditions are met (satisfactory management of public funds); participation in common donor funds, following an assessment of the quality of the procedures; when conditions not met, then will maintain EDF or budget procedures; mix of procedures can also be envisaged.
Finland	2/01 Decision in Principle will change country focus and resource allocations – fewer countries, more resources; where direct sectoral or general budgetary support is not yet possible, support will be given to projects in line with country priorities; collaboration between different sectors has increased and common meetings occur between desk officers and country consultants; increased workload in embassies.
Ireland Aid	Finalized education guidelines, still need updating.

JICA	JICA respects SWAps; SWAps have not caused it to change any of its policies towards the sectors; for implementation they use their own modalities; no specific SWAp guidelines; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considering the support of basket funding and wants to create the mechanisms for this purpose: the criteria, tracking funds, etc.; it is supporting projects within SWAps currently, utilizing government procedures; visibility of a Japanese presence is a critical issue for the Japanese public: budget levels could not be maintained with full participation in SWAps.
Netherlands	The education specialist work is done with its financial controllers right from the start on SWAps.
NORAD	The rationale for restructuring NORAD was to make an appropriate transition to a programme approach; the analytic capacities of regional departments have been strengthened.
Sida	Created a SWAp Task Force with three objectives: (1) to anchor and promote a broad programme approach to development co-operation firmly in the whole organization; (2) to identify and develop methods that tie different forms of programme support (budget support, sector programme support, untied core funding of organizations); and (3) to participate actively in the international efforts towards developing and implementing different forms of programme support. Part of this work will systematize what it knows and will reorient staff. Guidelines are needed to link SWAps with PRSPs and with balance-of-payments support.
UNICEF	In the process of restructuring policy and evaluation and programme divisions; focal points created to stimulate discussion and promote more effective communication across and within divisions; 1997 information note followed in 1999 with programme guidance document on SWAps; SWAps should not be equated with basket funding, can support government leadership, ownership, capacity building, design and formulation of policies; basket funding also restricts the level of partnership – e.g. private sourcing.

USAID	Wants to participate and is participating in SWAps; objects to baskets or pools, putting all money together, though not against budgetary support; there is a strong tendency to associate SWAps with the funding mechanism of baskets; USAID wishes to distinguish SWAps from baskets; one of the problems with pools or baskets is their very centrist vision: USAID does not want to funnel everything through the government; non-project assistance (NPA) is a modality, but it is not the core of the education support approach.[6]
World Bank	"The Bank will need to adapt its operational procedures and staff performance expectations to the fact that control over project development will rest largely with the borrower."[7]; the Bank does not lack appropriate lending instruments: it is a matter of how task managers use the instruments within the guidelines – they do not necessarily take advantage of the headroom given and use guidelines as excuse.

6. Disillusionment with NPA is expressed well in Moulton Jeanne *et al.*, "Paradigm lost?: the implementation of basic education reforms in sub-Saharan Africa", Technical Paper No. 109, Office of Sustainable Development, Bureau for Africa, USAID, Washington, D.C., May 2001.

7. World Bank. 2001. "A chance to learn: knowledge and finance for education in sub-Saharan Africa", Africa Region, Human Development Series, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

Competences, recruitment and professional development

Austria	Move to replace expatriates with local experts; training requirements determined locally; additional local staff hired as well as consultants at headquarters.
CIDA	Learning by doing and sharing; created network in 1999 and organized events; workshops organized; interpretative notes produced; recruiting more people in the education sector; need broader development expertise, more experienced people with negotiating, mediating, problem-solving skills.
DANIDA	Moving from narrow technical expertise towards general planning, monitoring and administration within the sector; more required on economic, policy analysis and general management information skills; not recruiting more, but when it does, it is more international, more managers and planners.
DfID	Question: do you need a full array of sector advisers if the main discussion is with the Ministry of Finance on overall public expenditure? Policy is still to have sectoral expertise in country, however; three sets of skills required for in-country personnel: professional, general development and interpersonal skills, e.g. negotiating and influencing.
EC	There is a reform in education recruitment: in two years all competences in Brussels will be concentrated at the delegations; staff will be increased at EDCO to implement social-sector units; a training programme on SWAps has been launched for those to be transferred to delegations; trying to reinforce local negotiating capacity.
Finland	More staff required in embassies; new kinds of knowledge and skills required: policy analysis and economic/financial management increasingly important; training is necessary for external consultancy companies involved in SWAps; ongoing training events for headquarters staff and pre-departure training for international missions.

Ireland Aid	Conducted survey of training needs: requirements identified were policy analysis, connecting education to macroeconomics and politics; negotiation, communication and planning skills; hiring more programme officers for larger embassies; team building at embassies; recruiting human resource specialists at HQ to implement improved career development; one-week seminars for education advisers on different topics; more cross-department Interaction and involvement of education advisers.
JICA	Its competences are not sufficient for SWAps: educational finance, planning; trying to recruit consultants and to find local expertise; seminars given to field staff pre-departure.
Netherlands	Lots of training/workshops; has worked with a whole embassy or several embassies on SWAps, on macroeconomic developments, institutional development, human resource development, etc.
NORAD	Too few people; has framework agreement with its Ministry of Education and with a local college; has established a SWAp Co-ordinator/Focal Point in the Technical Department – in place; needs to have deeper insight into financial aspects of SWAps; has to learn on the job, a question not primarily of sectoral competence but as a dialogue partner.
Sida	Trying to link SWAps with budgetary support, examining the integration of procedures, criteria, time-frames; linking economists with sectoral desks; most training has been at HQ; needs to spread the net; hired consultant specialist in financial management to strengthen programme officers; could do something similar on public-sector reform programmes, combining efforts across sectors; SWAp Task Force to help in competency development.
UNICEF	Structural change: Programme Division provides SWAp support, linking with Policy Division which now has Programme Group on SWAps; surveyed existing skills and capacity; identified need for skills in policy analysis, negotiation, public expenditure reviews, etc.; learned by doing, then developed primers, e.g. on SWAps

	and tried to embed orientation into established events, annual meetings of advisers; developed a training manual to develop skills in comprehensive assessment of education systems; local staff often have qualifications and experience in specialized education fields and may lack a wider system perspective; in recruitment looking for people with an understanding of system dynamics.
USAID	Broader education office being built (not in reaction to SWAps, but to earlier denuding of technical capacity) with six new staff.
World Bank	Shortage of experienced task managers who can conduct effective policy dialogue; plans to strengthen capacity for institutional analysis, technical review of economic and sectoral work, promote participation of all staff in professional development programme at IDS, Sussex; establish professional education presence in every field office with significant Bank-supported education project; Africa Region is the weakest performer generally[8] : this probably relates to the incentives given to staff managers to work in Africa (undesirable); supervision teams are doing a better job in building strong relationships with borrowers, donors and other stakeholders – increasingly supervision is from the field; Bank managers were sent to Harvard Business School on an executive development course, but it is not their technical skills, but their behavioural skills which need attention, e.g. less arrogance; too few education economists; trying to strengthen local recruitment and have more management from the field; high staff turnover means some of these problems continue.

8. From World Bank internal Quality Assessment Group reports.

Information needs and flow

Austria	Well-organized information exchange.
CIDA	Extranet site created 2001; organization is geographical; difficult to have much dialogue at the policy level; takes place at the operational level through teams; the need to harmonize management of information is a challenge beyond SWAp requirements.
DfID	Improved IT with access to intranet for all staff; created SWAPshop on intranet recording publications and meetings; still needs to better co-ordinate requests from HQ to in-country staff; balanced in-country teams ensures cross-sectoral co-ordination.
Finland	More macro-level information required at headquarters including on financial management and other issues outside education and on linkage with PRSP.
JICA	Participates in SWAp reviews and in some instances has covered the costs of such meetings; if it cannot provide funds to the basket, it is often considered an outsider and does not obtain the information required; the situation is changing somewhat; donor co-ordination division responsible for information gathering on SWAps and PRSPs; the global division, on education; the African division on interventions and activities; information is shared.
NORAD	Established social sector programme for discussion of health and education commonalities.
Sida	More interested in overall sector performance; has focal points in sectors to act as change agents.
UNICEF	Established an internal web site; still not satisfied with flow between countries and with headquarters; regions without effective networks for ensuring flow of information between countries, regional offices and HQ related to SWAps; more work now in annual reports on SWAps; annual consultations; Board requires

	regular briefings (since June 2001); Board expects reports on separate expenditures, e.g. around Board paper on SWAps; more support given to country officers on financial management and system change than previously; inadequate reporting of in-country donors' meetings.
World Bank	"A disturbing Bankwide finding is that economic and sector work is much poorer in countries with weaker policy performance than in good performers"[9]; with clients as co-drivers of economic and sector work, it is more difficult to manage; reorganization of Bank into networks has improved the availability of information; more learning from other regions; the quality of electronic support has improved, more inclusion of field offices.

Inter-agency collaboration

CIDA	Participates in donor agency discussions; invited to play active role; lacks resources, however, as has only half a person on SWAps and sector specialists are within regional departments, so difficult to participate; division of responsibilities within CIDA is a hindrance to international donor collaboration.
DANIDA	Attends inter-agency informal working group meetings.
DfID	Co-ordination in-country not tackled systematically and probably not possible at sectoral level unless there is a higher-level agreement amongst agencies re: in-country roles; increased polarization between 'in' and 'out' groups – like-minded do not dialogue well with those who do not join the SWAp process.

9. World Bank. "The quality of economic and sector work in FY00 – A QAG assessment, Quality Assessment Group", World Bank, para. 26.

EC	It is crucial that there be country and HQ-level communication (re: donor collaboration); little is reflected at ground level of agreements at HQ; code of conduct, an example.
Finland	Continued training seminars with other like-minded partners; informal contacts with other agencies.
JICA	It feels excluded from the like-minded donors' group; participates in annual consultations with other donors; had joint learning exercise with DfID, in Tanzania and Ghana.
Netherlands	Responsibility not only to share information, but also to be prepared to support each other; also to strive towards harmonization and equal standards and not to plant own flags. It is a policy that HQ must be informed when embassies are having difficulties with other donors.
NORAD	Held seminar on corruption and sector programmes; shares information with other agencies, viz. Nordic Education Group, but focus has moved from SWAps to macro-level discussions; at policy level donors agree, but they differ in the field.
Sida	Regular seminars.
UNICEF	Working with United Nations agencies, some good collaboration with DfID and some other agencies' country specialists; it seems that one has to put down money in order to gain respectability, even if one is a new participant to a SWAp; older partners are not respected unless money is put in basket; HQ-level inter-agency liaison does not necessarily result in country-level collaboration.
USAID	There is a difference between headquarters and the field. Funding and programme co-ordination comes from headquarters. It feels pushed, especially by the Dutch and the British.
World Bank	Problematic: the fact the WB is often the lead agency, though often without the capacity to co-ordinate, has meant that the Bank has been damned if it does and damned if it does not participate fully in SWAps; needs to recognize the need of agencies to operate

in different ways; if can get a pool, great, if not, it is all right to have parallel financing; stories of donor paralysis (inaction) have often been donors' fault, not government's – creates cosy relationships in the field with no one stepping on toes – sometimes one has to.

Levels of authority

Austria	In-country personnel employed by regional bureaux are autonomous; HQ backstops to check policy alignment.
CIDA	Centralized; few education people on the ground; has PSUs comprising consultants who are advisers, but project managers are in HQ; difficult to have dialogue on the ground via flying missions; higher transaction costs.
DANIDA	New policy is to delegate increasingly to the embassy; once project document has been approved, discrete decision-making possible in country, but not across budget lines.
DfID	Decentralization to country offices; headquarters' approval required only for higher and higher amounts; once there is clarity on the country strategy, education advisers have authority to speak to government.
EC	In-country delegations depend on policy guidelines from HQ; heads of delegation have some autonomy, but most sectoral staff lack the capacity to make decisions.
Finland	Centralized decision-making.
JICA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not JICA, is ultimately responsible for projects; information gathering done at field level, but Tokyo 'decides'; the field office is not able to speak with authority; works to rolling five-year plans.
Netherlands	Delegation of responsibility to embassies; embassies make annual plans and budgets; HQ makes overall policy, but it is up to embassies how to pursue SWAps.

NORAD	Regional department has the overview of the sectoral and macro levels; policy department looks at implications; full responsibility given to in-country staff; close co-operation between technical departments and embassies.
Sida	Embassy provides the basis for HQ decision-making; Project Committee must approve work of sector departments.; sector departments given guidelines by Africa Department.
UNICEF	Very decentralized; within Board parameters, country office has authority to work; creativity/strategies at country level; regions provide technical support and some oversight.
USAID	Very decentralized: projects approved at HQ but decisions about how to approach and implement programme are field-based; strategic objectives chosen in negotiation with the (Africa) bureau, then the field comes into play.
World Bank	Management mostly from HQ – Ethiopia the only exception; the country director (CD) is more important than before – in interacting with the government; CD decides whether the Bank will have an education project, then the responsibility for running it comes to the task manager; relative roles depends on the individuals; another layer comprises the networks.

Co-ordination with multisectoral development plans

Austria	Not participating.
CIDA	Being taken into account; programme frameworks are now situated properly within PRSPs; integration on a case-by-case basis.
DANIDA	It has not changed its work as yet.
DfID	Sustaining MOE dialogue whilst moving the overall budget support process is what it is all about; civil society participation needs developing; amending guidelines for country strategy papers to take account of PRSPs; annual reviews.
EC	SWAps should be integrated into PRSPs.

Finland	Education sector in close relation with PRSP processes.
Ireland Aid	Active engagement, committed to sectoral inclusion, critical of speed pushed by WB in some countries; hired public-sector reform person and economist.
JICA	SWAps should be integrated within PRSPs; PRSPs are accommodated within its country programmes.
Netherlands	The PRSP provides the context within which the sector is placed.
NORAD	Participating, but PRSPs not as central as could be; needs to streamline SWAps within PRSPs, but challenge is decentralization.
Sida	Linkage between SWAps and all budgetary support important; pressure to deal with whole sector emerges.
UNICEF	Sees SWAps as building blocks of PRSPs; involvement in the process is uneven, varying from country to country; UNICEF well positioned to bring in the intersectoral dimension but hindered by sectoral programme functioning; sometimes a tension between longer SWAps consultation process and imposed PRSP deadlines, especially in 2000.
USAID	Policy on PRSPs like that on SWAps: must distinguish the strategy from the paper; its programmes fit.
World Bank	Where there are sectoral plans, these can be incorporated into PRSPs; where not, they cannot be invented overnight; interim PRSPs were too speedy (for public relations and HIPC reasons), could not be appropriately underpinned; the PRSPs are a way of identifying the SWAps of least content and forcing them to come to grips; different agencies are still trying to figure out PRSPs: only in a couple of cases has it changed their decision-making; need to co-ordinate indicators; sector programmes should be the building blocks of PRSPs; team of five in Human Development office to ensure that its concerns are covered within the HIPC

documents; multisectoral tasks are led by the macroeconomic units and it is not obvious that the sectors get their share of the budgets; job of Human Development team is to strengthen the voice of the MOE within the MOF – not obvious that flying in staff is worse than country staff, as latter often replace the government.

What can be seen from the above table is a picture of agencies in flux. For the most part, there has been a move either decisively towards programmatic approaches, away from projects, or at least an accommodation to sector-wide approaches in trying to 'fit' bilateral projects within an overall sectoral strategy. The way this looks on the ground will afford us some of the detail of the actual implementation of individual agency policies, however. Challenges remain in meeting the ideals and the visions of sector-wide approaches no less than multisectoral development plans such as poverty-reduction strategies. As we shall see, despite what appears on the surface to be smooth donor co-ordination, the different approaches taken in-country are often contentious, without necessarily being confronted.

Some agencies have developed concerted training programmes; others have offered political direction and varied support for on-the-job learning and an exchange of experiences. All would recognize the need for a wider array of competences than the technical skills required for education projects. In the case of the World Bank, high staff turnover, together with the lack of sufficient incentives for staff managers to work in Africa are seen as problematic.

There is a widespread felt need for more macro-level education sector and economic performance information. Intra-agency divisions, whether by sector or level, have not always been broken down satisfactorily to provide this overview, nor the necessary interface with multisectoral development plans.

Inter-agency collaboration is not without its problems, as expressed by several agencies. There is often the lack of co-ordination between in-country

and headquarters levels as well as a feeling of exclusion by several donors not a part of the 'like-minded' donors' group. The World Bank has recognized the difficulty of being put in the lead agency role, without its having the capacity, necessarily, to co-ordinate the different donor agencies, especially in the absence of an adequate field presence.

The gamut from virtually total decentralization, as in the case of the Netherlands or, increasingly, DfID, to total centralization of authority, in the case of JICA, characterizes the different donor agencies, making in-country negotiation and decision-making less than straightforward. As was expressed in one interview at headquarters: one must recognize the need of agencies to operate in different ways. Again, it would seem that some of these issues are not being tackled sufficiently.

The co-ordination of agencies' contributions to education SWAps with multisectoral development plans such as PRSPs is mixed, some engaging so far as to change their decision-making, others not participating fully in the integration of their sectoral work with such larger plans. Similarly, within the United Nations family, there is insufficient understanding and co-ordination between teams working on EFA plans of action, SWAps, and PRSPs.

Chapter II
Introduction to the two case studies of education SWAps

The two cases chosen for this study were intentionally chosen, but not because it was thought they would be representative of education SWAps generally. In fact, it was thought that any two SWAps that could be chosen for the purpose of investigating both the implications for donors of pursuing SWAps in education and the success of donor co-ordination and collaboration on the ground – would be idiosyncratic. The state of play of the SWAps in Tanzania, or Ethiopia, or Nepal, or Ghana each has a story attached to it, some of which relates to the country's particular history or context, some to the individual personalities of those agency staff responsible for implementing SWAps, and some to the actual circumstances of the SWAp's development, probably in that order. So whilst the case studies of the two education SWAps here will be compared with each other, and it is possible to learn from their examples, there is also a lot in the explanation of why things happened as they did, that will be peculiar to those cases.

One further digression is necessary. How should one assess the state of play of a SWAp? Before travelling to southern Africa for these investigations, I was told that things were moving ahead very smoothly in both countries, that further monies in Zambia had been committed to the pooled fund, for instance, and that in Mozambique, a pooled fund was about to become a reality. What criteria should one use to assess the progress (and success?) of a SWAp? As will become clearer when we report on the issues that were foremost in the minds of different donors in relation to education

SWAps, there are different indicators of success, based on different interpretations, in the first instance, of what are the fundamental prerequisites of a sector-wide approach.

In *Appendix 3* some of these different definitions of SWAps are given. Government leadership and a partnership with donor agencies is assumed if not stated in most of the definitions. A single policy framework is also assumed if not stated directly, but where the definitions differ is whether or not they are underpinned by a single expenditure framework. Further, few of the definitions focus on the use of government procedures, a feature of Foster's definition and emphasized similarly by the World Bank. Foster importantly emphasizes the direction of change, rather than its attainment, and this is really where the difficulty lies in making judgements. Can transitional arrangements be understood to be going in the right direction or are they undermining the development of sustained institutional development? Judgement of the two case studies of education SWAps hinges on such calls. These two features not shared by all SWAp definitions, namely, a single expenditure framework and the use of government procedures, are key in this study's assessments of the government's capacity development towards handling adequately the prioritization and resource allocation decision-making required in a SWAp environment.

There are many other features on which judgements should also be made. The following are included here:

- the goals of the SWAp itself and the achievements (though it is early days);
- the ability to make judgements (the adequacy of data and policy analysis);
- a strategic plan that prioritizes expenditure;
- the adequacy and transparency of financial management;
- the leadership and commitment of government;

- the institutionalization of practices required within the ministry (judged at different levels);
- the effectiveness of decentralization (that the SWAp is not merely a capital city phenomenon) – could link participation with this;
- the mechanisms, processes and level of donor co-ordination and its effectiveness;
- the fit and linkage with PRSP processes.

Finally, the purpose of these case studies is to look at how well donor co-ordination is working in two education SWAp environments and its influence on the progress of the SWAps themselves.

Chapter III
The Zambian Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme

Background

Zambia's Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme, BESSIP, had its origins in a sector- rather than a sub-sector-wide programme, the Education Sector Investment Programme, ESIP. Dating from early 1998, however, it was decided to focus on the sub-sector, as this would entail only one ministry, rather than the four dealing with the whole sector. Co-ordination of four different ministries together with the group of donors was too challenging. BESSIP thus dates from September 1998 when its Joint Appraisal was carried out by a large, multi-donor/Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) group. BESSIP derives from the 1996 education policy paper, *Educating Our Future*, and a programme implementation plan (PIP) was presented at the Joint Appraisal covering the envisaged investment over the four-year period, 1999-2002.

The overall goals of BESSIP are to improve access, quality and the relevance of education. Specifically, the objectives are focused on increased enrolments and improved learning outcomes in order to achieve 100 per cent enrolment of eligible children in Grades 1-7 by 2005 and 100 per cent in Grades 1-9 by 2015. The original eight component programmes comprised:

- Programme management;
- School infrastructure

- Teacher development, deployment and compensation
- Educational materials
- Equity and Gender
- School health and nutrition
- Curriculum development
- Capacity building and decentralization

At the November 2000 Semi-Annual Review, it was decided to add a separate component programme for HIV/AIDS.

The total programme cost was calculated at US$340 million for the period 1999-2002, of which the GRZ share was costed at $167 million, comprising primarily personnel emoluments, recurrent departmental expenditure and a small contribution to educational materials, desks and school infrastructure.

A preparatory fund of pooled finance was established mid-1998 in advance of the appraisal, with pledges of about $1 million in total from a group of four donors, the Dutch, the Norwegians, the Irish and the British. The preparatory fund was to establish the BESSIP management structures, facilitate consultative meetings, and fund various preparatory studies, including a Human Resource Development Plan, school mapping, national assessment, etc. These activities, not surprisingly, were not concluded in the short six-month period available, and the funds were carried over into 1999 for the continuation of preparatory activities. However, BESSIP activities began, and pooled as well as earmarked disbursements were made in 1999, despite the fact that not all was in place that was envisaged in preparation for the formal start of BESSIP. The argument that was used at the time was that it was important to get started in order to motivate people; capacity would be developed along the way.

BESSIP has succeeded in integrating a diverse set of financing modalities within the current programme. It has subsumed ongoing projects, integrated new projects, included earmarked funding that utilizes Ministry of Education management structures, and it has also received budgetary support for the programme as a whole from six donor agencies, the Dutch, Ireland Aid, NORAD, DfID, DANIDA and Finland. These 'poolers', however, have not exclusively contributed to sectoral budgetary support; they have also supported projects, some pre-existing and some new, subsequent to the Joint Appraisal, the latter two contributing $1 million each, more as tokens of goodwill than as policy cornerstones. Both DANIDA and Finland chose to underwrite some of the BESSIP components, but to maintain control over the funds in traditional project mode. (A $30 million agreement was signed with DANIDA for 2000-2004 and an agreement worth $8 million with FINIDA for 2000-2003.)[10] DfID had originally flagged a £25 million potential multi-year contribution to the pool, but to date has worked to annual commitments of £2.1 million, the first made in 2000, with a possible subsequent £2.1 million in 2001.

Four distinct 'cases' of educational aid were delineated in the Joint Appraisal, and subsequently used. Case 1 entails 'pooled' funds controlled by the MOE and available for all BESSIP components. Case 2, is distinguished from Case 1 by the requirement of a separate, parallel account, though still controlled by the MOE (e.g. the IDA loan monies). Cases 3 and 4 are variations of project funding for designated components and distinguished by MOE (Case 3) or donor (Case 4) control of the funds.

Whereas the World Bank is often used as the 'donor of last resort', after grant, rather than loan monies have been made available, in the case of BESSIP, the IDA credit was the first agreement to be signed in 1999. A total of $40 million was made available in the first phase of the programme from

10. Other donors operated similarly, viz. JICA $8 million (2000); EU 10 million ECU (2000-2004); USAID $4.2 million (1998-2001); ADB $3.5 million (2000); OPEC $2 million (2000).

1999-2001. To some extent, this, together with the fact that the Bank had been instrumental in developing the former ESIP, put an imprint of an older Bank sector investment programme on BESSIP.[11] Although it is technically possible for the IDA credit to be fungible across the different components, in practice, the Bank is underwriting a substantial proportion of the capital development programme in infrastructure, educational materials and the provision of vehicles. This is a 'normal' divide between the Bank and the grant-giving bilaterals, but the two-year procurement plan required by the Bank as a condition of effectiveness has lessened the flexibility that might otherwise be applied to the roll-out of such a complex educational development plan in which the management capacities of the Ministry of Education are being challenged.

The IDA Credit Agreement contrasts with the three, subsequent bilateral agreements signed in 1999, with the Netherlands, Ireland and Norway for a total of $31 million[12]. These agreements provided 'pooled' funds, controlled by the Ministry of Education and commingled in a common bank account. The IDA credit is accounted for separately in its own bank account, though the funds are also controlled by the Ministry. The Netherlands, Ireland and Norway each had pre-existing provincial-wide programmes, covering several components. These have continued and, in some ways, have served as testing grounds below the national level.

11. Whilst the current definition of a SIP is indistinguishable from a SWAp (See *Appendix 3*, definition 2), earlier SIPs did not reflect some of the principles on which the current definition is based, such as the reinforcement of government procedures. World Bank procedures would often subsume others', including not only the Ministry's procedures, but other donors' as well. (See, Ratcliffe Mike and Macrae Murray, "Sector-wide approaches to education: a strategic analysis, Education Research Report, Serial No. 32, Department for International Development, London, August, 1999, p.28). This was an issue in the negotiation of the IDA loan for BESSIP: that subsequent contributors to BESSIP would be beholden to World Bank negotiated procedures.

12. Dutch $11 million (1999-2001); Irish $3 million (1999-2002); Norwegian $17 million (1999-2002).

Current issues

This is the background to BESSIP. What is the current situation? How does BESSIP measure up? Slow progress has been made on several fronts. It is still too early to judge the goals of BESSIP itself. As a result of the first National Assessment exercise, there is now a learning achievement baseline against which improvements will be able to be measured, but the level of expenditure, especially on significant quality inputs such as learning materials, has been too low to have had an effect (see below), and it is also too early to judge the effects in the classroom of teacher development.

The necessity of a strategic plan was late in coming to BESSIP. A start was made following the Joint Appraisal in 1998, and various priorities were identified, but the notion of a strategic plan that would enable the Ministry to make resource allocation decisions rather than listing activities – as in the case of the original PIP – was not a home-grown idea. In 2001, perhaps with the need to incorporate the concerns of the education sector in a PRSP, following the rushed interim exercise the previous year, considerable work on a strategic plan began in earnest. A separate committee, also comprising donor and Ministry representatives, put together their contribution to a full PRSP.

Several issues have plagued BESSIP from the start. Amongst the most important have been the lack of restructuring of the Ministry of Education and the lack of expanded decentralization following the pilot Copperbelt programme. The adequacy and transparency of the financial management system in the Ministry was also an early problem. However, unlike these other problems, it was addressed by several means: the appointment and continued renewal of the contract of a consultant BESSIP financial manager, the appointment and training of a cadre of accountants, periodic reviews of the state of health of the system including the engagement of a management accounting firm, and the regular meetings of a joint Ministry of Finance/ Ministry of Education/donor representative Technical Financial Committee.

The lack of restructuring of the Ministry of Education resulted in a fundamental weakness in the BESSIP management structures, which otherwise, tried to incorporate appropriately the new BESSIP functions within Ministry line management. There are two things to note. Firstly, having a BESSIP Co-ordinator separate from the Director of Planning[13] meant that the information on which policy analysis and resource allocation decisions would be made was separate. Second, the relative lack of co-operation between the two individuals, whose positions, with no restructured appointments having been made, were thus in flux, created two nodes of budgeting, one, under the Planning Directorate, for the Ministry as a whole, and the other, under the BESSIP Co-ordinator, for BESSIP. Three years on from the Joint Appraisal this situation has not changed, though it was mooted that there would be some appointments made to restructured positions in the near future.

It can be argued that these structural imbalances do not matter as the pooled BESSIP funds come into the main budget allocation for the Ministry of Education via the Ministry of Finance. However, in practice, there is a separate decision-making and authorization process surrounding the use of BESSIP funds as compared with 'routine' Ministry budget allocations. Thus, irrespective of the transparency of BESSIP's financial management – and no questions have been raised in this regard – there is a virtual parallel structure in operation.

In addition, there has not been a neat fit between particular BESSIP components and existing line functions, for example in the case of School Health and Nutrition and HIV/AIDS. Further, the additional BESSIP responsibilities did not always fit with prior job descriptions nor were they

13. It was originally intended that the Director of Planning would be the BESSIP Co-ordinator. The post was vacant at the time of the Joint Appraisal, and the eventual appointment was not made on the terms of a restructured Ministry. The Director of Planning, subordinate to the BESSIP Co-ordinator, a Deputy Secretary, was appointed after BESSIP was under way.

supported, necessarily, by data on which to build policy analysis within those positions. The Equity and Gender component, for instance, concentrated primarily on girls' education, probably as much because of the prior experience of the component manager as the lack of data feeding the position on which to base wider, equity-targeted interventions.

Where an individual donor carves out a component or a part of a component for support – as opposed to contributing to the pooled monies – the lack of conventional line management responsibilities for the heads of the more 'ill-fitting' components can result in project-like control by the donor. As asked by one such donor representative, in such cases, should they be more focused on the capacity development of the component manager or the delivery of the outcomes? There is no doubt that the frustration was shared by the component manager as well.

Clearly, the lack of progress on restructuring, especially in the context of its anticipation, has exacerbated the institutionalization of 'normal', even if reformed, government procedures. It has also meant that discussion of extra allowances for BESSIP managers has continued, understandably.[14] The lack of decentralization, similarly, has meant that the planning and budgeting processes have been exclusive to the central ministry, rather than being developed in the provinces or districts. This situation has not been helped by the relative distance of the Planning Directorate from BESSIP decision-making. Enabling non-governmental organizations to play a role in BESSIP has been facilitated by several memoranda of understanding, but developing the appropriate range of mechanisms for engendering wider stakeholder involvement in BESSIP has been slow and difficult.

14. In September 2001, there was some confusion surrounding whether allowances of between $500-750/month had been made to BESSIP managers as the principle of any such allowances being directly related to restructured salaries seemed not to have been upheld.

Despite these structural imbalances, there has been much progress in getting BESSIP started. The management bodies meet and are functional; activity-based annual budgeting is now routinized; there is improved reporting; and whilst lower than expected, expenditure – and the activities and development it supports – has been increasing. At the last Semi-Annual Review, it was recorded that expenditure was up from 15 per cent in 1999 to 50 per cent of the 2000 budget.

In discussions with the various donor representatives in Lusaka in September 2001, the issues that they raised were as follows. There was real concern around the lack of restructuring and decentralization. In addition, the capacity of the Ministry of Education and, specifically, the staff's ability to engage in appropriate policy analysis and strategic planning was raised. One donor representative went as far as to comment that as long as there was no planning unit to speak of, BESSIP was really like a large project, as BESSIP management was not in on the overall Ministry budgeting, and the management tools they would require (i.e. from the planning unit) were missing. The earlier prioritization of the development of the Planning Directorate has not gone very far.

Several donors expressed their concern about quality improvements reaching the schools and classrooms, wanting not only to see visible improvements at the local level, but better information flow to and from schools. This is not unrelated to the concern surrounding the lack of decentralization, however.

Procurement and distribution was a final concern shared by many donors that flowed from two factors: (1) the seeming reversion to traditional practices in the Ministry's Procurement and Supplies Unit (MEPSU), notwithstanding the year-long consultant's contribution to reforming inefficiencies; and (2) what appeared to be irregularities in the recent awarding of textbook supply contracts that had been brought to their attention. The slow pace at which

MEPSU moves in the procurement process, together with the lack of efficient distribution mechanisms had been raised at the last Semi-Annual Review (June 2001) given the very low budget spend: (less than 3 per cent). Since the time of this investigation, however, a new procurement unit has been established, staff transfers have been made and the BESSIP Co-ordinator has requested support for procurement, both in terms of capacity and also in terms of carrying out the next procurement process through an agency such as Crown Agents. What seemed to be irregularities in the awarding of textbook tenders, subsequently, was found not to be due to corruption per se, but rather to inefficiency, poor management and the complacency of MEPSU staff which, hopefully, will be rectified by the new unit.

Various criteria have been put forward here not necessarily to judge attainment, but in order to assess some measure of progress. The leadership and commitment of the government have certainly been evident, and seem to have survived the change of Ministers, though most donors are waiting to see what will happen in the forthcoming national election. Whilst there has been sufficient leadership and commitment for BESSIP to progress, another concern expressed by several donors as well as Ministry staff was the concentration of this leadership around such a few individuals. It was thus heartening – even if in another sense discouraging, knowing the structural imbalances reported above – that the BESSIP Co-ordinator herself noted that the most serious issue which concerned her was the institutionalization across the Ministry of new practices that had been subsumed under BESSIP.[15]

Donor co-ordination surrounding BESSIP is good. Regular meetings are held and information is shared. Donor representation on the Programme Co-ordinating Committee has increased. Not only those contributing to the

15. Since the time of this investigation, the BESSIP Co-ordinator has been promoted to the position of Permanent Secretary. It remains to be seen whether her new central role in the Ministry will assist the institutionalization of new practices which was her former concern.

pool are able to attend. Reports of these meetings are then shared with the Informal Donors' Group.

The slow pace of change, however, works against the desire of donors to disburse. This is not merely a World Bank task manager's fear. Other donors have disbursed despite benchmarks not having been reached. There is a tension surrounding what is the appropriate timing, given the intention by all to ensure that the Ministry is in the driver's seat.

The task for donors and country stakeholders alike in implementing a SWAp is:

- to agree a vision;
- to work through various modalities towards integration;
- to keep the donors away from the driver's seat but still in the car;
- to restructure and define jobs and competences for them as necessary;
- to design and implement continuous capacity building linked to performance assessment and pay;
- to use government mechanisms and strengthen them;
- to remain flexible to enable latecomers to join whilst still maintaining the vision.

The problem is that the above tasks have to be carried out in politically volatile environments, both in the country, as well as in the Ministry itself. Notwithstanding the vision, donors are not co-ordinated and make demands on Ministry personnel, for data, for reports, for visits. Add to this the politically correct reticence of donors, and problems, rather than being resolved, often go from one annual review to the next.

A combined effort is needed to integrate the donors in this vision to ensure that macroeconomic budgetary support, sector-wide support, and projects all contribute to sustainable government systems that are capable of

delivering the goals of the educational policy, and not just ticking off boxes on donors' logframes.

To avoid repetition, other issues surrounding donor co-ordination will be raised in a more general context in *Chapter VI*, and wider issues of effect – distinguishing the process from the actual progress made – will be raised in *Chapter VIII*.

Chapter IV
The Mozambican Education Sector Strategic Plan

Background

In May 1998, the five-year Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) for Mozambique was jointly appraised by the Ministry of Education and international donor agencies and found to be a framework for sector-wide programme support to the education sector. This was the culmination of a process which began with the articulation of a National Education Policy in 1995 with the twin goals of increasing access and improving the quality of education, and a pre-appraisal meeting with donors in September 1997. In addition to the establishment of the ESSP implementation structure, the Joint Steering Committee (COPA), the Co-ordinating Group (Conselho Tecnico) and the Executive Secretariat, six substantive working groups were set up concerning:

- quality of education;
- access and gender;
- non-formal education;
- technical education and vocational training;
- finance and management procedures;
- institutional development.

The ESSP set out a framework for support to the education sector for the period 1999-2003 centred on the two goals of access and quality identified in the National Policy on Education and a third: the development of an institutional and financial framework that will sustain Mozambican schools and students into the

future. Agreed indicators for monitoring achievement include an array of enrolment, completion, learning achievement and examination pass-rate targets, reductions in repetition and drop-out rates and increases in decentralized management. Following the successful Joint Appraisal, an IDA loan of $71 million was negotiated successfully. Of the total cost of $717.2 million, government's contribution was outlined as $444.6 million, comprising mainly salaries and other recurrent costs. The IDA loan was to "maintain a presence in strategic components ... while other donors finalize their programmes."[16] This would consist of support to teacher development, learning materials, direct support for schools, school construction and rehabilitation, girls' education initiatives, organizational structure and decentralization and financial management, with smaller amounts for other areas.

Since 1995, several donors (Netherlands, Sida, Ireland Aid and CIDA) have operated what is essentially a pooled fund for the procurement and distribution of learning materials, the Caixa Escolar. This, together with classroom and teacher-training college construction, girls' education, teacher training and general capacity building, have comprised the main areas of donor contributions aside from the support of particular provinces, in which an array of activities has been supported by individual donors. The Netherlands, Ireland Aid and DANIDA each has multi-faceted ongoing projects in different provinces, and DANIDA is about to commit $65 million to further work in three provinces over the next five years. At the time of the Joint Appraisal about $85 million had been committed to ESSP by various donors to support ongoing activities, and approximately $105 million was expected to be provided additionally by donors over the first five years.[17]

16. The World Bank. 1999. Project Appraisal document on a Proposed Credit in the amount of 51.1 million SDR (US$71 million equivalent) to the Republic of Mozambique for an Education Sector Strategic Programme (ESSP), Human Development 1, Country Department 2, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 22 January, 1999.

17. World Bank. 2001. "Education and health in sub-Saharan Africa: a review of sector-wide approaches, World Bank Group, Human Development, Africa Region, Washington, D.C., 2001, p. 125.

In reviews held subsequent to the Joint Appraisal, various commitments have been undertaken that relate to the implementation of the ESSP. A Code of Conduct was approved, but not signed, following the first annual review in 1999. This emphasized the need for flexibility in donor financing to promote the use of common implementation procedures in the context of a sector-wide approach and was based on the EU Code of Conduct. Following the 2001 annual review, a Statement of Intent was signed by the government and the major donor agencies setting out an agreed planning and budgeting cycle. This includes a system for confirming indicative donor commitments, the absence of information on which has made sectoral planning difficult. An undertaking to establish process indicators to evaluate how the co-operating partners are working in relation to the agreed SWAp framework – and also, to some extent, the Ministry, for planning and finance – is also included amongst other Ministry reporting requirements such as improvement of the quality of its activity plans.

Although provincial-level strategic plans have been developed, like the rolling headquarters-level plans, it has been difficult to apply activity-based budgeting to these, as the existing financial management systems do not afford the identification of individual activities. The introduction of new financial management practices across the whole of the public sector includes the overhaul and integration of the Ministry of Education's accounting system within this larger public reform. Thus, given the length of time this is likely to take, it is not surprising that it was decided to create an off-budget pooled fund handled by the Ministry of Education rather than the Ministry of Finance. Several joint donor-government financial management missions have been undertaken, which, it is hoped, will result shortly in the establishment of this pooled fund, the Education Sector Support Fund, likely to be supported substantially by the Netherlands, Sida and Ireland Aid and potentially attracting token support from others, e.g. the World Bank, DANIDA, Finland and CIDA, until such time as the fund has been shown to work well. It is intended that the fund will be a "transitory mechanism to build financial management capacity

and systems", "building upon existing structures and reform processes under way."[18]

Other undertakings to which the Ministry has committed itself have included the establishment of directorates of Teacher Education and Adult Education (already undertaken), further assessment of the structures and functions of the Ministry, the development of school-based activity plans and a host of sub-strategic work being lined up for approval concerning the other areas covered by the ESSP, namely, adult and non-formal education, technical and vocational training, and secondary education – i.e., all but higher education.

Current Issues

Several critical issues were pointed out at the last review (2001), the need for:

- an evaluation of ESSP implementation bodies in order to propose more effective functioning of these mechanisms;
- ESSP activities to be internalized throughout the Ministry at all levels, so that implementation of the ESSP is seen as the core function of the Ministry;
- expediting the process towards budget support and improving the predictability of donor funds;
- improving communication between the centre and local levels (and vice versa).[19]

Underlying these issues are several concerns expressed by donor representatives and some Ministry staff. Several people referred to the need

18. Republic of Mozambique Ministry of Education and International Co-operation Agencies. 2000. Report of the Second Annual Review, Maputo, 22-26 May 2000, Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP), Maputo, May 2000.
19. Republic of Mozambique Ministry of Education. 2001. Report of the ESSP Third Annual Review Meeting, Documento No. RAR.01, Maputo, May 2001.

for a 'cultural' change, a move away from the hierarchical decision-making in which the 'boss' is seen as the problem-solver and there is an abnegation of responsibility to make decisions and to take responsibility for decisions once made. The inheritance of a sound planning system in which good data collection is the norm, in practice, has not afforded appropriate policy analysis and priority setting. Part of this problem is the cultural bias, but part is the status of planning which had authority over finance, and thus budgets were made to fit the 'plan'. Further, the division of labour between planning and finance, which gave responsibility for capital costs to planning and for recurrent expenditure to finance, entailed the equivalent of two separate budgeting exercises. Additionally, a considerable amount of educational expenditure has been out of the control of the Ministry, being in donor hands, as part of education projects. Thus, together with the inappropriateness of the system of financial management for outlining activity-based budgeting, the capacity building required of the Ministry for decision-making in a SWAp environment has been considerable. The concerns seem to relate in one way or another to this fundamental weakness.

Another concern raised was the squaring of decentralization with the SWAp. This is both a matter of insufficient capacity below the level of the Provincial Directors of Education, but also a product of this older hierarchical 'culture'. Surely that is part of the explanation as to why the provincial ESSPs – that have been written – have not been fed into the national ESSP.

It is nearly the half-way mark for the period of the IDA loan. Of the $71 million made available, only $2 million has been spent. This is partly because of the reluctance of the Government to use loan monies before grant monies have been expended, the Bank being seen as the 'donor of last resort', but it is also symptomatic of ESSP and the implementation mechanisms simply not working. As one donor commented, "Very little has been achieved to date from the programme apart from natural developments, as there has been no real push on the ground." This is despite a lot of progress in donor

co-ordination, and the working out of transitional mechanisms for pooling donor funds, at least from those donors who are still on board for substantial budgetary support: Sida, the Netherlands, and Ireland Aid. Since an initial expression of interest, DfID has pulled out of any commitments to the Education Sector Support Fund.

If we go through the same checklist used to assess progress in BESSIP, ESSP, despite tackling more of the fundamental issues of donor co-ordination in principle, viz. the Code of Conduct, the Statement of Intent, etc., in practice, there has not been much to show for such efforts: the preparatory stage has been very long. It is too early, thus, to judge the SWAp on the achievements targeted.

One of the reasons given for the slow pace of implementation is the unpredictability of funds arriving at the provincial level for anything but salary expenditures. For instance, it was explained that last year only 40 per cent of non-salary budgeted expenses came through to the provincial level due to 'liquidity problems'. Further, as these amounts were typically tied to particular activities and/or areas, it was not possible to engender efficient financial management, as flexibility on the use of such funds was extremely limited.

On other issues, ironically, despite very impressive data collection, policy analysis is not widespread, limiting the ability to make judgements to a few individuals holding the reins of power. Whilst ESSP was conceived as part of a wider poverty reduction strategy, the linkage with the PRSP (the PARPA, the local term) is not as close either as could be expected or as is necessary for prioritization and budgeting purposes. Indeed, the Statement of Intent addresses some of these issues in rescheduling the planning and budgeting deadlines so that there is a closer fit.

The aim of producing activity-based budgeting and the training surrounding such exercises, especially as part of the lead-up to the inauguration

of the Education Sector Support Fund, should address the need for a strategic plan that prioritizes expenditure, rather than comprising, basically, a wish list. The capacity building surrounding financial management should bring about appropriate skills which also will ensure greater transparency. As was seen to be the case in Zambia, whilst there is committed leadership, it comprises far too narrow a base; ESSP needs wider championing.

Chapter V
Comparison of the two education SWAps

As can be seen from the two case studies, there are many similarities between the two SWAps, certainly in terms of the challenges faced three years into the process. One must recognize and applaud the progress that has been made in many different areas, not least the delineation of the reforms envisaged and the implementation plans to make them a reality. However, problems related to the long-term institutional development of the respective ministries of education – together with the insufficiently widespread donor accommodation to the procedures necessary to bolster the ministries' institutional development – have slowed down the process.

It was striking in Mozambique how apologetic donors and Ministry staff alike were over the fact that the Education Sector Support Fund was about to be established off-budget. This alone exemplified how the principles and the vision of a SWAp had been digested. It may well be that had a pool not been established already in Zambia, similar concerns would have been expressed there. However, in practice, the fact that Zambia's fund, strictly, is 'on-budget' does not make the difference that is being emphasized in the Mozambican case. In Zambia, the separate budgeting processes for the Ministry as a whole and for BESSIP in particular, go on, irrespective of the fact that the BESSIP monies are channelled through the Ministry of Finance. As has also been explained, the procedure for attracting and, indeed, obtaining BESSIP funds is also separate from the budgeting and authorization procedures for 'normal' Ministry expenses. This is because BESSIP is not 'normal'; it does not fit the old norm of x percentage increases on last year's budget figures across the

board, but requires some determination of the needs for developmental expenditure that has seldom been afforded by the Ministry's budget allocations.

In the case of Zambia, of greatest concern to the BESSIP Co-ordinator was the institutionalization of procedures across the Ministry that were being introduced with these new developmental budgets under BESSIP. Highlighted were the difficulties of management positions not synchronized with existing Ministry line functions. In the case of ESSP, the lack of progress in the implementation of the reforms could be attributed to the non-functioning working groups, the principle being to have the directors (line managers) in charge, but there being no practice in this regard.

In other respects, Mozambique would seem to be better placed than Zambia for pursuing its SWAp. Thus, on the one hand, it has a functioning and productive planning directorate, and statistics needed for planning and policy analysis are available. Additionally, provincial-level strategic plans have been drawn up. However, despite these advantages, little has been made of them. In relation to the institutionalization of procedures, policy analysis is not widespread, and below the level of provincial director, the mechanisms of decentralization are still to be developed in the sense of schools' plans feeding district plans, feeding provincial plans which, in turn, feed national plans, viz. a rolling ESSP. Instead, as expressed during interviews, the 1998 ESSP is 'the' ruling document, and it needs to be enlivened with these other inputs from outside central headquarters.

In Zambia, notwithstanding the pilot decentralization of the Copperbelt which preceded BESSIP, the mechanisms and capacities for making decentralization alive (no less extended to the country) have been notable by their absence. Provincial BESSIP plans have not been drawn up, and without an effective and adequately staffed planning unit, it would be difficult to feed them into national BESSIP plans even if they were. Nor are the data available for the policy analysis that needs to be nurtured throughout the system.

Yet, in another respect, Zambia is ahead of Mozambique, namely in its ability to draw up activity-based budgets – even if these are not appropriately integrated with the national budget for the Ministry of Education. Further, a lot of problems have been ironed out in the functioning of pooled funding, and Zambia's education SWAp is notable for the flexibility of integrating funds across different modalities. But is this remarkable? Is it not just facilitating what has been and is likely to continue in Mozambique in terms of donors hedging their bets and continuing to fund their projects at the same time as contributing to the pool or simply to fund their projects?

However, if Mozambique has yet to establish its Education Sector Support Fund, in contrast to Zambia, it has been able to procure and distribute learning materials for a considerable time, using the Caixa Escolar which, in terms of its success, should be the envy of Zambia. It may be that the Caixa Escolar will be as difficult to incorporate into Ministry of Education procurement and distribution procedures as has been the case with reforming the Procurement and Supplies Unit in the Ministry in Zambia, but it has a proven track record.

At the time of the fieldwork, the question was raised as to whether ESSP-related allowances existed or had featured in discussions amongst Ministry managers and donor representatives. Interestingly, Mozambique seems to have avoided this fraught area that is one of the items on the top of current donor-Ministry agendas in Zambia. Notwithstanding the EU Code of Conduct[20] in this area, the payment of allowances has been observed in many countries more in its breach than its implementation, and it seemed that in the absence of restructuring, Zambia was about to follow this pattern.[21] The less overt

20. Code of conduct for education sector funding agencies, Sector Development Programmes for Education (SDP-ED), Horizon 2000 Education Experts Group, November 1997.

21. After the time of this investigation, it was agreed that 'top-up' allowances for BESSIP managers would end in December 2001, but whether restructuring does proceed at once will determine whether similar pressures for such allowances are raised once more. Workshop allowances, however, are to continue to be paid.

precedent in Zambia, however, is alive and well, backed by Parliament: daily sitting allowances for attending meetings that can amount to well over the equivalent of a teacher's monthly salary. So it is not surprising that much of the time-consuming, detailed BESSIP work, such as writing the annual work plans and budgets, attracts such perks, sometimes over whole weeks at local motels rather than Ministry of Education offices.

The discussion has focused on what the ministries have or have not done, but what about the donors? What is the state of donor co-ordination in these two SWAp environments? The next section explores what emerged from this investigation.

Chapter VI
Donor co-ordination

On the surface, donor co-ordination in both the case-study countries looks smooth. Regular meetings are held, information is shared, and progress is being made towards the fulfilment of the objectives of the respective plans. However, this co-operation hides inconsistencies in the approaches taken by the different agencies and the problems that this causes for the ministries. For instance, in 2001, the Ministry of Education in Maputo received 23 independent donor missions! Is it sufficient for donors only to ensure that their programmes roughly fit the plans and its components, or should there be higher expectations, correspondent with the principles expressed in the EU Code of Conduct? What should be the responsibility of donor agencies to each other in ensuring a higher level or standard of co-ordination? This section reports what was said by the various respondents on donor co-ordination, both from within the two countries and from headquarters. It then discusses outstanding issues that need to be resolved.

Several agencies reported that they felt excluded – both from discussions and from decision-making – in particular, by those agencies that viewed themselves as 'like-minded', a term which was viewed by some as offensive, it was stated, and should not be used. The main message behind this view was that it was inappropriate to exclude agencies whose guidelines did not allow them to contribute to basket or pooled sectoral funding. Further, the confusion of SWAps with particular financing modalities was inappropriate: participation in SWAps need not entail basket funding.

Whatever position one takes on these issues, it is clear from these comments not only that there are hurt feelings, but that there are very different

conceptions of what is entailed in sector-wide approaches. Earlier, the paper discussed the importance of progressing towards the use of government procedures as a key feature of SWAps. This idea features in several forms in the EU Code of Conduct:

- in avoiding 'buying out' civil servants for private donor consultancy;
- in ensuring that donor-funded Technical Assistance reports primarily to government managers, supports government institutional capacity, and is not restricted to supporting individual donor projects or programmes;
- in working towards using the financial, procurement, monitoring and reporting procedures and guidelines of the recipient country;
- in working through existing structures in order to ensure maximum integration in Ministry policy.

Yet, as a recent report on donor co-ordination in the education sector puts it, "the EU Code of Conduct appears to be poorly disseminated and widely ignored."[22]

This underlines a problem that was highlighted by a number of respondents: the lack of integration between headquarters and in-country co-ordination between donor agencies. One respondent commented, "It's a disaster. We've been trying at headquarters level and have made progress. It is the sad reality that there is no reflection at ground level."

In both Zambia and Mozambique different donors have contributed from their education aid programmes to different provinces and tried to effect 'mini-SWAps' in reality, often covering the gamut of components meant to contribute to overall national education reform. Yet, it would seem that there has been very little concerted sharing of experiences across these different provinces among donors.

22. ActionAid Alliance. 2001. "Increasing the effectiveness of donor co-ordination: a case study of the education sector in Bolivia, Burkina Faso and Tanzania", ActionAid Alliance, London, January 2001.

Another important topic raised was that donors should ensure that none among them tempts the government to move away from the SWAp. Put differently, an informant commented that donors often use alternative modes (than the SWAp) and thereby buy results at the cost of weakening the budget institutions. Several other donors defended their particular participation in SWAps through their own modalities, traditional projects (rather than through government procedures), explaining that the government had requested their help.[23]

This raises the question of what should be the nature of responsibility towards other donors. One of the views expressed was that it was only up to donors, individually, to dialogue with government. Another argued that donor co-ordination is the responsibility of the government. In other words, it was not donors' responsibility to highlight problems, weaknesses or inefficiencies. Another put it somewhat differently. "It is our responsibility to deliver on our respective commitments. Our responsibility is to question, to find ways to be more effective, to ask these questions to ourselves as well as to others, to propose processes and solutions to overcome our constraints, not just to point fingers."

Others felt even more strongly about donors' responsibilities to each other, for instance, "to be willing and able to mobilize the less involved", or as another said "to control the donors ourselves". Indeed, one example was given in Mozambique of how the donor representatives in the Joint Ad Hoc Group, rather than the Ministry of Education, was tasked (by the Ministry) with approaching an in-coming donor which did not seem to be respecting SWAp procedures. Another informant noted that "donors must have the courage to fight and to have the back-up from other donors". In other ways, there are instances of the teaming up of individual donors, such as in 'sleeping partner' arrangements whereby one donor funnels its support through the other, letting the in-country presence of the one donor represent both in

23. As was pointed out by an informant, however, those of us involved in SWAps must keep reminding ourselves how Afro-centric they are: the idea that you can influence policy in a whole sector does not work for the most part in Asia.

effect.[24] Clearly, these sort of arrangements, for example, in the case of the Dutch channelling over £16 million through the DfID office in Malawi, utilizing DfID procedures with DfID reporting back to the Dutch, reduce dramatically the demands on the partner government and the number of donors having to be co-ordinated!

As can be seen from these reported views, donors do not think alike on the issue of the appropriate roles each should take towards other donors in SWAp environments. It is important to raise this issue because it would seem that those who back away from a mutual donors' responsibility take the view that it is the government's business, not theirs as donors. After all, the SWAp is meant to be the government's sectoral policy agenda. Whilst there are examples of governments refusing aid, such refusals tend to be exceptions, in the case of relatively strong or less aid-dependent governments.

Another way of putting the question of donor responsibility might be to ask why it is that there are so many inconsistencies in the modalities of donor contributions to SWAps? In many ways unequal partnerships seem to lie at the root of government acquiescence. Donors may not want to take on this responsibility towards each other, but it would seem a natural role where central governments have put their signatures on codes of conduct which can be abused in the countries in which they are represented. It was notable that the Dutch introduced the policy – in an otherwise decentralized system – of embassies reporting to headquarters any difficulties they experience in donor co-ordination.

It would seem useful to raise the issue of donor responsibilities towards each other in SWAp environments in the IWGE meeting for which this study was commissioned.

24. There are increasing numbers of such 'sleeping partner' arrangements. In addition to the Dutch-DfID agreement in Malawi, for instance, there is discussion of whether Sida would like to channel potential support to Rwanda through DfID. Sida, similarly, has such an arrangement with the Netherlands in Mali and with NORAD in Malawi.

Chapter VII
Comparison of in-country views with headquarters' perspectives

Table 2 synthesized the issues raised at agency headquarters. This section summarizes the different perspectives presented by in-country staff of the same agencies in cases where more than one agency expressed a similar viewpoint which was at variance with that given by their headquarters. (In the majority of cases, there was agreement – or no distinction between the perspectives of headquarters' and in-country personnel.) The disagreements reported here are highlighted more to give a flavour of some of the dissenting in-country views. They should not be seen as being representative for, in most cases, as should be apparent from the list of those interviewed in *Appendix 2*, only one person per agency was interviewed, and not necessarily (depending upon the representation) in each of the two countries.

Support given by some agencies to their in-country personnel is frequently viewed as sub-optimal. Several staff from different agencies reported feeling that they were ill-prepared for the roles they had to assume, both in terms of orientation to SWAps and also, more generally, in terms of their own agencies' operational procedures. It was simply expected that they would learn the ropes. Some felt that whilst they were suited for project work and had the appropriate technical expertise for such roles, they were not given support which had been tailored to their much wider roles in a SWAp environment. Several in-country staff felt that inter-agency skill sharing – in-country – could and did help them in their roles.

Some donor representatives felt ill-informed of their headquarters' policies on SWAps. Further, in the cases of those programme officers with responsibilities wider than for the education SWAp, parallel, vertical communication with headquarters often meant that they were given conflicting advice. In some cases, information dissemination from headquarters would be infrequent, surrounding programming or supervision missions. In cases even when such communication was forthcoming, there was often an understandable time lag, and some felt that they were not sufficiently sharpened to the new perspectives, and thus not listened to as well.

Different representatives had different experiences of being offered and/ or encouraged to take advantage of opportunities for professional development depending on their line managers. In some cases the situation appeared to be worse for local hires, some of whom felt they had no promotion possibilities anyway. Not unrelated to this was the feeling expressed by some local representatives, that their views were not valued, despite being able to offer a different perspective from non-locals. Depending on the level of authority of local delegations, some in-country staff have also been placed in the role of information-collectors and observers, rather than significant contributors to ongoing policy dialogue.

A small number of agencies reported views about African postings as not constituting a positive career move. One stated that the continent was seen as a dumping ground for failed diplomats. However, this was by no means a universal view. In other cases, development specialists, in particular, preferred Africa to other postings.

Finally, to the extent that the integration of education SWAps within PRSPs demand some multisectoral co-ordination and discussion, several in-country staff reported how infrequent or non-existent were such discussions within their own agencies, except at the instigation of the partner governments! Indeed, some staff reported that some of their agencies were as excited about

their inputs into PRSP discussions as the substance of such discussions. Within the local offices of several agencies having traditional divisional boundaries, multisectoral planning and discussion would seem to be more a principle than a practice.

Chapter VIII
Concluding remarks and issues for discussion

This study suggests that different donor agencies often face similar challenges as they try to adapt to handle better current aid modalities such as sector-wide approaches. The challenge is their own institutional development – the precise issue that is on the agenda for the ministries of education they are trying to assist. No donor agency criticized the sector-wide approach harshly in helping to build sustainable capacity in partner countries' ministries of education. Yet, the commitment to SWAps by donors to ensure that they are capable of implementing such an approach covered a wide spectrum. If SWAps are intended to assist in the development of sustainable education systems, it is still too early to conclude that there are many success stories.

The case studies of the two education SWAps in Zambia and Mozambique highlight some of the problems currently being experienced by the ministries of education and by the donor agencies in achieving their visions and objectives. Not only does much more need to be done on both sides to address weaknesses and shortcomings, but a new problem is looming. Thus, just as pooled finance for educational development is coming on-stream, some donor agencies seem to be moving beyond SWAps to macro-level budgetary support in an attempt to ensure that sectoral development is underpinned by the overarching institutional development of the public sector. This tends to suggest a certain amount of 'moving the goalposts'. For instance, despite playing a strong role in the movement towards setting up pooled finance for ESSP, DfID announced in the summer (2001) that it would not be contributing to the pool immediately, despite the imminence of the establishment of the Education Sector Support Fund. Macro-level budgetary support was being emphasized instead, together

with project funds for some of the capacity building necessary within the sector.

This is an interesting example of a donor, indeed, a 'like-minded' donor, choosing to step away from its peer donors, not because its procedures and guidelines restricted it from contributing to a pooled fund, but because of a new focus on wider (higher level) issues, a decision taken by the now decentralized country office, but with support from headquarters. The argument goes something like this: by putting money into the pool fund which is off budget, the government cannot rationalize its expenditure across the system. Funds in an off-budget pool are programmed to be spent on activities. Whether these activities constitute recurrent or investment expenditure, this situation makes overall financial prioritization more difficult and thus less effective. Within a SWAp, a limited budget will have been created that is not integrated with overall Ministry expenditure plans and therefore will become akin to a macro project. How can one tell whose priorities are being promoted, on which pooled fund monies are to be expended? If the monies had been channelled from the Treasury, would the same choices have been made to use those funds for those particular priorities? The choice of channelling aid funds 'upstream' does not obviate working within the sector. The vision is that one can better deal with the problems in the system that prevent the Education Sector Support Fund from going on budget.[25]

This particular example brings up another strand of the earlier discussion on donor co-ordination. It relates to whether donor agencies in SWAp environments should 'go it alone' or work towards compromises with the other agencies. This study is not able to suggest that there is 'an' answer but, rather, that such an issue merits more discussion than simply accepting the new pattern of events. There may well be 'appropriate' inconsistencies across

25. One wonders whether DfID would have contributed to the BESSIP pool, knowing now what it does about the structures in place in Zambia, if it had assumed the wider macroeconomic approach it has adopted in Mozambique.

different countries. The policies one adopts in one country may not necessarily be the same as in another.

A second related issue that merits discussion is the appropriate roles for donor co-ordination at headquarters v. the in-country level. As we have seen in this study, there are very great differences in the levels of authority given to donor representatives in-country. The Dutch and the British would seem to have effected the greatest degree of decentralization to their country offices. Other agencies, such as JICA and Finland, require head office decision-making. However, it was interesting in the case of the Dutch, that a specific request has gone out that problems of donor co-ordination be reported to headquarters.

If we recognize that most donor agencies are undergoing considerable institutional change in order to accommodate the different requirements of SWAps, it is understandable if individual donor representatives are affecting the record of achievement on the ground. This is likely to be as much the case for donor representatives as it is for technical assistants who will 'fit' differently within different communities of donors as well as government civil servants. Skill-sharing across the donor community is only one aspect of such different 'fits'. There is wide variation in how supported individuals are within different organizations. How well a SWAp progresses will be affected by the way in which different strands of the donor community go about their business. There has been much less monitoring of donor community activities and performance than of partner governments. Yet, for SWAps to work it is necessary for the donor community to be brought in line with the visions for the sector. Information sharing is the least common denominator of a supportive donor community. Co-ordination must be built locally and supported centrally, as necessary. In Mozambique at the time of the fieldwork, there was discussion of creating process indicators for monitoring the donor community and its co-ordination. For such measures to work, there needs to be greater clarity of and agreement on what is or is not supportive of the SWAp. Donor co-ordination, especially in relation to grappling with many of the differences in

perspective that are laid out, for instance, in *Table 2*, has not really been a part of the donor communities' agendas either in Zambia or Mozambique, nor, very likely, in other countries as well.

The two case studies illustrate that there are still many, visible rough spots concerning the achievement and reinforcement of the institutional and behavioural changes necessary to create successfully integrated (recurrent and development) education budgets in partner countries. These rough spots cover three main areas: restructuring ministries; effecting decentralization; and the establishment of sound financial management competences. The current slow pace of SWAp implementation creates problems for all donors, both those deeply committed to SWAps and those sitting more on the fence. Firstly, the slowness limits the 'buy-in' of those looking for results on the ground. Arguments, understandably, are put forward to explain policy: we cannot afford to let another generation be denied access to quality education. (This implies that we know that our projects will deliver, so the pull is back to projects.) Second, slowness disillusions those keen to spend increasing sums on education, which having been identified as a significant means of poverty alleviation, is a major tenet of most donors' development policies. (This suggests that if we cannot fund the SWAp because the sector's problems have not been resolved, then we can fund the macro-level budget and continue to support projects which will overcome the sector's 'rough spots'.)

Meanwhile, few aid-dependent governments can afford to send away any of the donor community even if some of the principles of the SWAp process are compromised. Such governments are having to respond constantly to different initiatives, in spite of the SWAp environment to which multiple donors have signed up. This is the reality that needs to be addressed in bringing donor co-ordination up to a higher standard. Should not there be some monitoring of whether the donor community is on track? (And the same goes for monitoring of TA as to whether capacity building is taking place.) Unfortunately, what one seems to find repeatedly is the TA that is liked

within ministries is that which carries out effectively line management functions and thus relieves the administration of some of the burdens it has. This may entail capacity building by osmosis, but it may be nothing more than a gap filler.

The bulk of this paper really has to do with changing institutions, and how one brings individuals along, whether in ministries of education or in donor agencies. There are a number of very interesting insights or lessons – perhaps as much along the lines of what 'not to do' as what 'to do'. Here are some of them:

For the donor community:

- do not leave newly appointed recruits in the lurch;
- ensure that lines of communication are kept flowing and that these are not only parallel lines;
- recruit staff with sufficient negotiation, co-ordination and policy analytic skills or be prepared to invest a lot of money in training staff in these areas;
- keep a close watch on the process and progress of donor co-ordination and whether donor staff are supportive of or are frustrating the vision of the SWAp – even if you are not contributing to the pool;
- bring up issues of out-of-line donor co-ordination not only in-country, but also at headquarters and ensure that headquarters-level inter-agency meetings deal with such issues – and report back to your field staff on such meetings;
- deal with the so-called 'excluded' donors, rather than leaving it solely to the Ministry.

In the case of the ministries, the SWAp is likely to sink or swim, particularly in the early stages, in relation to the commitment of a few individuals. Beyond those early stages the following should be considered:

For the Ministry of Education:

- ensure that the Ministry is capable of sustaining the reforms, with system change that can ensure its own replication[26];
- ensure that system change is not limited to headquarters if decentralization is a feature of the reforms;
- ensure that there is a tight fit developing if not developed between a medium-term expenditure framework and the sectoral resource priorities.[27]

Some of the findings of a recent study of SWAps[28] dovetail with the conclusions of this investigation:

- the drive towards sector programming is in conflict with other donor initiatives to encourage decentralization of decision-making and public expenditure;
- line ministries have seen SIPs[29] as a way of escaping constraints imposed by finance ministries;

26. This is not the same thing as capacity building as, with capacity building, you can train a cadre of individuals and when they leave – usually for better salaries – if you have not changed the Ministry's own systems, you are virtually back to scratch, but for the hindsight!

27. Just as donor representatives in education SWAPs have often emerged from professional educational backgrounds and require professional development in co-ordination, negotiation, policy analysis, and financial management or financial orientation, so do Ministry staff require professional development, especially the SWAp managers, if they are not used to managing large budgets and having activity-based budgeting rather than merely a percentage ratcheting up of existing budgets, the rationale for which has long departed from overall strategic goals.

28. Jones Stephen, "Increasing aid effectiveness in Africa: the World Bank and sector investment programmes" in: The World Bank: Structure and Policies (C.L. Gilbert and D. Vines, editors), Cambridge University Press, 2000, cited and quoted in id21News, Issue No. 57, October 2001 (www.id21.org).

29. SIPS (Sector Investment Programmes) are defined by Jones as the instruments for implementing SWAps.

- SIPS have not necessarily reduced transaction costs of aid but have instead often created parallel systems outside normal government planning and budget systems.

All three have featured in the two case studies presented here.

There seems to be consensus about the desirability of using SWAps as a means of ensuring country ownership of educational reform policies, aided by less fragmentation of Ministry efforts in pursuing them. SWAps provide a means of co-ordinating the different contributions to the development of the education sector. Thus, even against the lack of consensus over modalities of finance, donors must ensure that they work together effectively – beyond the mere sharing of information – so that some of the current shortcomings illustrated in this study can be overcome in order to produce replicable systems of education that can deliver access to quality education for all.

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Appendix 1
Interview frameworks

Questions for headquarters' staff
(an adaptation of which was used for in-country staff)

Competences, recruitment and professional development

1. Highlight any changes in recruitment policies or training that have resulted from pursuing education SWAps. Have you identified any specific training needs? Please draw attention to any specific competences you have had to develop and the suggestions you have from your experience of how to go about this.

Intra-agency collaboration

2. Has there been any change in the collaboration of your education advisers with staff in other departments within your agency, that relates to pursuing education SWAps? Have any new groups within your agency been created as a result of pursuing SWAps? What suggestions would you make for improving intra-agency collaboration?

Workload

3. How has the general workload changed as a result of pursuing SWAps? Are there differences by country (for example, for different country desks where SWAps are at different stages of play?). What have been the consequences of any changes in workload? How have you coped with them?

Information needs

4. Have your information needs changed as a result of pursuing education SWAps? If so, how has this been handled? Has it been adequate? What

suggestions would you have for ensuring that your information needs are met adequately?

Flow of information

5. Has the flow of information within your agency changed in relation to pursuing education SWAps? What suggestions would you make for improving such flow?

Policies and guidelines

6. Describe any differences that have come about in how policies are developed as a result of pursuing education SWAps. Have your guidelines had to be revisited? Should they be?

Inter-agency collaboration

7. Have your contacts with other agencies (at headquarters) changed in any way as a result of pursuing education SWAps? If so, what have been the results of such changed contacts?

Acceptance of SWAps

8. Describe what if any processes you have had to go through in your agency in order to gain wide acceptance of the SWAp methodology in education. Perhaps you could describe what were the most significant stumbling blocks and how these were overcome. Locate support or opposition from various groups within your agency.

Levels of authority

9. Could you comment on the different levels of authority required in your agency for handling SWAps from headquarters down to in-country personnel. What is the division of labour between the roles of political and development staff (if you have both) whether in-country or between country and headquarters' levels?

Co-ordination of sectoral with multisectoral development plans

10. Could you comment on the co-ordination of sectoral development funding with multisectoral development plans, such as the poverty-reduction strategy process or public-sector reform plans? What are the current co-ordination practices and are these adequate for overcoming the challenges faced? What have been the implications for your practices of engagement in education SWAps as a result of some of the above multisectoral approaches? What has been learned? How should things be sequenced, administered, etc.?

Questions for Ministry of Education staff

1. The Ministry of Education's perspective on SWAps v. projects:

   What is the Ministry of Education's position vis-à-vis existing projects, new projects? Are any stipulations laid down (by the Ministry) regarding prospective projects?

2. The Ministry of Education's perspective on the PRSP process and where the sectors fit in:

   What has changed as a result of PRSPs?

3. The Ministry of Education's evaluation of donor co-ordination, the achievements, the current challenges, the prospects:

   What could usefully be addressed possibly at headquarters level, rather than with in-country staff?

4. The Ministry of Education's position re: technical assistance, the terms of reference, control and supervision of TA:

   Has this changed as a result of the Ministry's current engagement with donors?

5. The Ministry of Education's perspective on the participation of civil society in various stages of the current engagement with donors in education – the history, the achievements, the challenges, the prospects.

Appendix 2
List of those interviewed

Austrian Development Co-operation
Lydia Saadat, Vienna

CIDA
Pascal Desbiens, Ottawa
Real Lavergne, Ottawa
Joyce Muchelemba, Lusaka
Bryce Fieldhouse, Maputo

DANIDA
Poul-Erik Rasmussen, Maputo (recently arrived from Copenhagen)
Marianne Christensen, Lusaka

DfID
David Levesque, London
Steve Packer, LondonDigby Swift, London
Richard Teuten, London
Terry Allsop, Harare
Richard Arden, Lusaka
Allison Beattie, Maputo

EC
Jose Paniagua, Brussels
Chantal Symoens, Lusaka

Finland
Heikki Kokkala (written), Helsinki
Fred Brooker (TA, not representative)

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Ireland Aid
Liz Higgins, Dublin
Edna Kaluluka, Lusaka
Paul O'Donoghue, Maputo

JICA
Noriko Suzuki, Tokyo
Mr. Watanabe, Tokyo
Taeko Inagaki, (Embassy of Japan), Lusaka
Hakushi Hamaoka, Lusaka
Satoshi Nakamura (TA not representative), Lusaka

Netherlands
Hanke Koopman, The Hague
Given Daka, Lusaka
Bert Huguenin, Lusaka
Ana Rochkovski, Maputo

NORAD
Lornts Finnanger, Oslo
Thorbjorn Gaustadsaether, Oslo
Sissel Volan, Oslo
Turid Hallstrom (not interviewed, but at Donors' Meeting), Lusaka

Sida
Ingemar Gustaffson, Stockholm
Agneta Lind, Stockholm (recently arrived Maputo)
Hans Persson, Stockholm
Karin-Anette Andersson, Maputo

UNICEF
Peter Buckland, New York
Jama Gulaid, New York
Marzio Babille, Lusaka
Karen Joergensen, Lusaka

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Birthe Locatelli-Rossi, Lusaka
Stella Manda, Lusaka

USAID
Diane Bell-Prouty (consultant), Washington, D.C.
Brian Frantz, Washington, D.C.
Kay Freeman, Washington, D.C
Jim Hoxeng, Washington, D.C.
Donald Mackenzie, Washington, D.C.
Muneera Salem-Murdock, Washington, D.C.
Kent Noel, Lusaka

World Bank
Richard Cambridge, Washington, D.C.
Birger Fredriksen, Washington, D.C.
Delfin Go, Washington, D.C.
Bruce Jones, Washington, D.C.
Alfred Nickesen, Washington, D.C.
Sudhir Shetty, Washington, D.C.
Irene Xenakis, Washington, D.C.
Clement Siamatowe, Lusaka
Noel Kulemeka, Maputo
Ministry of Education, Maputo
Mafalda Duarte
Virgilio Juvane
Ministry of Education, Lusaka
Barbara Chilangwa
Arnold Chengo
Simon Chiputa

Others
Wolfgang Gmelin, DSE, Bonn

Appendix 3
Different definitions of sector-wide approaches

1. Foster, Mick. *New approaches to development co-operation: what can we learn from experience with implementing sector-wide approaches?* Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure, Working Paper 140, Overseas Development Institute, London, October 2000, p.9., the defining characteristics of a sector programme are that all significant funding for the sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure programme, under government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, and progressing towards relying on government procedures to disburse and account for all funds. This working definition deliberately focuses on the intended direction of change rather than just the current attainment.

2. World Bank, *Education and health in sub-Saharan Africa: a review of sector-wide approaches*, World Bank Group, Human Development, Africa Region, Washington, D.C., 2001, p. 4.

   SIP characteristics

   In synthesis, there seem to be four main features, as follows:

(i) Partnership

- local stakeholders in charge – programme directed by government
- all key donors sign on to the programme;
- co-ordination of donors by government;

- broad consultation with stakeholders.

(ii) Comprehensive sector policy framework

- sector-wide scope, covering all relevant areas, policies, programmes, and projects;
- based on (a) an overall policy for the sector (principles and objectives); (b) strategy of measures to achieve policy objectives over the medium term (about five years); and (c) a programme of specific interventions in the near term (two-three years).

(iii) Expenditure framework

- overall expenditure programme, including definition of feasible intersectoral allocations and the resource envelope;
- intrasectoral spending plan, derived from programme priorities.

(iv) Management systems and capacity building

- common implementation structures and procedures (harmonization of donor procedures);
- use and strengthening of government institutions, procedures, and staff (rather than setting up parallel systems and using external technical assistance).

3. DANIDA, *Guidelines for sector programme support*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DANIDA, May 1998 (Revised), pp.3, 10.

National ownership is central to the SPS approach. National ownership should not only be at the central government level, but also at other levels involved in SPS-related activities.

Compared to the project approach, SPS emphasizes a longer time-frame for broader-based Danish assistance to a national endeavour in a sector.

This in effect means that assistance would be extended to the national policy and strategy level as well as to programme implementation level.

4. UNICEF, *Programme guidance on sector-wide approaches to development and UNICEF roles*, Headquarters Programme Instructions, CF/PD/PRO/99-001, 28 June 1999, p.2.

A sector-wide approach (SWAP) can be characterized as a sustained partnership led by national authorities involving different arms of government and, where relevant, donor agencies, with the goal of contributing to development in the context of a coherent sector, through a collaborative programme of work. Structures and processes for negotiating strategic and management issues and reviewing sectoral performance against jointly agreed milestones and targets are established. A SWAp aims to provide a comprehensive framework for the reform and development of sector policy and programming over a multi-year period.

The sector-wide approach would normally require the establishment of a medium-term plan for the sector ... The planning framework typically seeks to involve all critical stakeholders in the sector, including the donor community. The medium-term focus of the planning effort provides the opportunity to address fundamental policy and institutional reforms on a continuing basis.

A sector-wide approach will often include a specific financing mechanism. This aims to provide a co-ordinated financing plan to meet the costs of the sector programme, ideally covering both recurrent and capital expenditures. ... financial planning for a SWAp should incorporate both domestic and international financing and comprehensively account for all sector expenditures.

5. DfID, *Learning opportunities for all: a policy framework for education*, DfID, London, 2001, p.38 (Figure H).

   Characteristics of a sector-wide approach:

   - governments define a macroeconomic framework within which medium-term expenditure frameworks determine the resources available for individual sectors;
   - governments lead a consultative process with stakeholders and investors, inducing development agencies to define: an overall sector policy, framework priorities, objectives and performance measures, expenditure programmes, institutional reform and capacity building, jointly agreed management, reporting and accounting arrangements;
   - major donors jointly support the process and the practice of the sector programme, preferably using common procedures;
   - technical assistance is commissioned by governments rather than donor agencies.

6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Education: a basic human right, development co-operation and basic education: policy, practice and implementation*, The Hague, Holland, January 2000, pp. 34-36.

   The guiding principle is that the country is responsible for its own education system, and that national government bears primary responsibility for developing a framework for educational reform policy and its implementation. This approach is based on co-operation between the national government, civil society organizations and the joint donors to improve the education sector, on the basis of equal partnership and within an agreed framework of principles, objectives and agreements.

   Within a sectoral approach, the form of funding is not specified in advance. In principle, the preferred construction is basket funding under which donors

provide joint budget support for implementation of the agreed reform programme across the entire education sector or sub-sector, with no funds earmarked for a specific activity or component....Flexible funding modalities are needed ...

7. Sida, *Sida's policy for sector programme support and provisional guidelines*, Sida, Stockholm, 2000, p.27.

   Cornerstones of a sector programme:

   Participating together with other financiers in a sector-wide approach which has the aim of supporting the development of the (education system) in a partner country can best be described as a gradual process in which the ambition is to provide co-ordinated long-term support linked to the country's objectives for the sector. Co-operation is of a long-term character and is based on trust. The process is implemented by and through existing organizations and structures in the country. Follow-ups, reports and evaluations are made on the basis of jointly agreed criteria and routines. A continuous and open dialogue is an important part of the process.

8. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland, *Education for all: Finnish development co-operation in the education sector*, Helsinki, 2001, pp.11-12.

   Characteristics of sector programmes:

   - comprehensive development plans drawn up in the target country;
   - responsibility rests mainly with the country's authorities and the stakeholders;
   - implementation utilizes the partner country's existing administrative structures;

- shifts the focus from aid inputs to analyzing the outcome of this assistance;
- impacts are monitored through jointly defined and agreed criteria.

9. CIDA, *Strengthening aid effectiveness: new approaches to Canada's international assistance program – for consultation*, June 2001, Section III.b. (extracted from http://remote4.acdi-cida.gc.ca/swaps)

   Sector-wide approaches (SWAps) involve a co-ordinated effort to set out a strategic approach in a particular sector and a co-ordinated effort implementation. This may involve donors implementing projects that support a country's sectoral policies in the traditional way. In other cases, donors may put their aid funds into a common pot that would then be used by the developing country to implement the sectoral action plan.

10. European Union, Task Team on Sector Programmes, *Sectoral policy support programmes*, November 2001, Draft, p.3.

    Three criteria of the Special Programme for Africa:

    (i) Existence of a sectoral policy document and of a strategic framework;
    (ii) Existence of a medium-term sectoral expenditure framework and of an annual budget;
    (iii) Government-led donor co-ordination.

To avoid sterile debates it may be useful to recall a few principles on which there is agreement in the international donor community:

- the sectoral approach is a process that needs to be supported and encouraged;
- there is no universal model but rather an approach which needs to be adapted to each country and sector;

- an essential element of the approach is the ownership by the country of the policy and its implementation;
- a Sector Programme may be financed in different ways:
  - budgetary support;
  - common donor fund;
  - specific donor procedures (similar to the one used for projects but in a common framework);
  - the idea of a common donor fund implies the existence of clear procedures which are harmonized and common to all donors.

The tendency is however to favour the transition towards the first funding mechanism.

The sectoral approach must be accompanied by efficient and effective monitoring and evaluation systems, oriented towards the assessment of impact and outcomes.

Appendix 4

Terms of reference for follow-on study on experiences and implications regarding sector programme support processes for agencies

Background

During recent years a number of development co-operation agencies have shown increasing interest in developing Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps), and various developing countries have engaged in this kind of co-ordinated endeavour at sector level. In doing so, co-operation between agencies has certainly been strengthened, as has to some degree relations between involved countries. Co-operation between agencies has been strengthened especially at country level, but also in general, and at headquarters level, exchange of information has taken place and methodological issues have been dealt with in seminars and workshops. Various studies have been carried out to collect information on cases where SWAp processes have been and are being conducted.

In this context, there is also a need for involved agencies to look into the consequences at agency level per se regarding organization, training, development of policy and methodology, means of co-operation internally and externally, need of additional information, etc. A study of these issues, as for the agencies, is relevant both at headquarters level and at country level. Experiences and felt needs are probably different, depending on the perspective and different responsibilities following the distribution of tasks between the two levels.

A limited study: "Implications for agencies of pursuing sector-wide approaches in education" was presented at the meeting with the International Working Group on Education (IWGE) in Florence in June 2000. After the meeting Sida gave a promise to widen and deepen the scope of the investigation and to add to the study several case studies.

In order to further document relevant experiences and compare similarities and differences between agencies and also country-based variations, it was suggested that a more comprehensive review be carried out aiming at an informed discussion of involved issues at the next meeting of IWGE, to take place in Lisbon in November, 2001.

Objectives

The main objective was to review practical experiences and implications at agency level of processes regarding Sector Programme Support, analyze them and present important issues for discussion between agencies, especially in relation to the education sector. A further aim of such a discussion was to draw joint conclusions and to facilitate continued co-operation between the agencies at country level as well as at headquarters level. The continuing work with SWAps in developing countries should also benefit from improved co-operation between the agencies.

Tasks

To collect and analyze information from relevant entities (especially the education sector), from a wider range of agencies, at headquarters and at country level, covering:

- new demands on agency competences and how they have been dealt with;
- changes in workload and consequences;

- internal development and training of staff that has taken place and identified needs for further training and adequate methods;
- internal processes to create acceptance for the SWAp methodology;
- consequences for intra-agency, as well as inter-agency, collaboration;
- development of policies and guidelines;
- changes in organization related to SWAp;
- type of contacts with other agencies and results;

To illustrate the issues with one or two case studies.

To draw conclusions and make recommendations regarding future work in the agencies regarding SWAp in relation to the stated objective, and to suggest topics for further discussion at the Lisbon meeting.

To prepare OH material for presentation of the study at the IWGE meeting in Lisbon, 19-21 November 2001.

Methodology

The consultant should draw on existing documentation and studies, analyze these documents, send an appropriate questionnaire to agencies and interview selected agency staff and other relevant persons. Special attention should be given to issues regarding the education sector, but also legal and financial management aspects should be addressed.

Special attention should be given to one or two case studies of SWAp-processes.

The methodology of the study will be further elaborated in collaboration with the consultant to be selected for the assignment.

Manning schedule and time-frame:

The study shall be carried out by a consultant, in consultation with agency staff with considerable experience in development co-operation methodology and who have insight in the SWAp methodology.

The tasks would be carried out mainly in September/October 2001. The deadline for the preliminary report was 2 November, 2001.

Reporting

A draft report should be ready and submitted to Sida not later than 2 November and sent out by Sida to relevant agencies for comments. Comments should be presented to the consultant before 13 November. A final report should be submitted to Sida with sufficient copies for distribution to participants in the IWGE meeting in Lisbon.

The report should be written in English using Word 97. It should be sent by e-mail, or as hard copy together with a diskette to Sida.

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